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1. This submission is made to the Senate Community Affairs References Committee’s 
(‘Senate Committee’) inquiry into violence, abuse and neglect against people with 
disability in institutional and residential settings, including the gender and age related 
dimensions, and the particular situation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
with disability, and culturally and linguistically diverse people with disability (‘the 
Senate Inquiry’).  
Preliminary Definitional and Conceptual Issues 
2. At a core level, issues related to violence against people with disability, particularly 
institutional and legal barriers to recognition of this violence, are related to the cultural 
devaluation of disability and the extent to which as a society we view people with 
disability as worthy of inclusion in our communities and, at a very base level, worthy of 
recognition as human beings and worthy of life.  
3. Critical disability scholarship and disability rights advocacy has critiqued medical 
models of disability which characterise disability in terms of internal, individual, 
pathological deficits and provided alternative ways of approaching disability attentive 
to disability’s complex lived, systemic, cultural, political, social, environmental and 
historical dimensions. This scholarship and advocacy has also identified the 
medicalisation of people with disability as a key means through which discrimination, 
oppression and violence done to these individuals has occurred, including specifically 
through medical interventions framed as necessary, protective, benevolent and 
empowering.  
4. In the course of inquiring into violence, abuse and neglect against people with 
disability, the Senate Committee should engage with the underlying ideas and 
assumptions about disability both in society generally and specifically those within 
and produced by law. Moreover, alongside making recommendations directed 
towards reforming specific laws and institutional practices, the Senate Committee 
should consider making recommendations for contesting and shifting cultural 
ideas around disability at a fundamental level. 
5. Following on from these general points about the Senate Committee’s approach to 
disability, there are a number of preliminary matters concerned with the scope and 
meaning of key concepts contained in the terms of reference. 
‘Disability’ 
6. In the course of the inquiry, the term ‘disability’ should not be given a medical meaning 
grounded in individual, diagnostic criteria. Instead the Senate Committee should 
approach disability in terms of its complex lived, systemic, cultural, political, social and 
historical dimensions. In light of the focus of the inquiry, the Senate Committee should 
also be particularly attentive to the ways in which the very concept of disability itself 
might be bound up with violence, abuse and neglect, as opposed to disability as a 
concept and an embodied phenomenon existing prior to and discrete from violence, 
abuse and neglect. For example, the Senate Committee should consider (a) the 
relationship between medical understandings of disability and violence, and (b) the 
ways in which the political and historical aspects of violence, abuse and neglect against 
marginalised groups are themselves factors in the emergence of disability in these 
groups (eg the violence and neglect inherent in colonialism and neocolonialism, sexual 
assault of women, poverty and environmental pollution can themselves generate 
disability1).   
                                                          
1 See, eg, Beth Ribet, ‘Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of Survivor-Oriented Advocacy’ (2010) 17(2) 
Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 281; Beth Ribet, ‘Emergent Disability and the Limits of Equality: 
A Critical Reading of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' (2011) 14 Yale Human 
Rights and Development Law Journal 155. 
‘Violence, abuse and neglect’ 
7. The author commends the broad understanding of the term ‘violence, abuse and 
neglect’ described in the terms of reference. In keeping with the broad interpretation of 
this term, the scope of ‘violence, abuse and neglect’ in the Senate Inquiry should not be 
governed by or limited to forms of violence that are prohibited by law (eg by reason of 
legal definitions of assault and battery in criminal law and tort law). The Senate Inquiry 
should consider forms of violence, abuse and neglect which are currently permitted by 
law, notably (to borrow the terminology of the terms of reference) ‘constraints and 
restrictive practices’ and ‘forced treatments and interventions’ which are lawfully 
conducted pursuant to third party consent, court or tribunal authorisation or civil or 
forensic mental health legislation (rather than only those practices which are done 
contrary to the law). This is discussed further below in the part on ‘disability-specific 
lawful violence’. 
8. Consideration of these forms of violence is profoundly important because the Senate 
Committee by reason of term of reference (e) is concerned with ‘the different legal … 
frameworks and practices across the Commonwealth, states and territories to address 
and prevent violence, abuse and neglect against people with disability’: the Senate 
Committee should consider not only laws preventing or prohibiting violence, but those 
that explicitly permit and legitimate violence, abuse and neglect.  
‘Institutional and residential settings’ 
9. The author commends the broad understanding of the term ‘institutional and residential 
settings’. The inclusion of criminal justice settings in the terms of reference is 
particularly significant, but this should extend beyond prison to other criminal justice 
settings including forensic mental health facilities and police stations. The inclusion of 
these settings in the scope of the inquiry is important for a number of reasons. First, 
people with disability are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.2 Second, and 
compounded with the first reason, people with disability in the criminal justice system 
experience high rates of victimisation (both specifically in prison, as well as across 
                                                          
2 See, eg, Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and Melissa Clarence, ‘People with Intellectual and Other Cognitive 
Disability in the Criminal Justice System’ (Family & Community Services: Ageing, Disability & Home Care, 
2012); Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and Melissa Clarence, ‘Background Paper for Outlaws to Inclusion 
Conference February 2012: People with Mental and Cognitive Disabilities: Pathways into Prison’ (University of 
New South Wales, 2012). 
their life course).3 Third, criminal justice institutional and residential settings can 
themselves be sites of violence, abuse and neglect which can cause disability or further 
exacerbate disability.4 Fourth, people with disability in the criminal justice system are 
typically marginalised in policy and scholarly discussions of violence against people 
with disability. The fifth reason is that people with disability in the criminal justice 
system might not be readily viewed as ‘victims’ of violence due to the pervasiveness of 
absolute dichotomies between victim and offender, coupled with institutional barriers to 
access to justice and legal barriers to recognition of violence in these settings, such as 
statutory limitations on recovery of compensation for civil liability and practical 
limitations on access to legal assistance. Finally, on a broader level, there is the 
possibility that the cultural and legal acceptance of incarceration as a legitimate societal 
and legal practice per se (as opposed to viewing prison and other criminal justice 
settings as inherently violent, abusive or neglectful) risks the normalisation of violence 
against people with disability occurring within criminal justice settings.  
10. The term ‘institutional and residential settings’ should include hospitals, mental health 
facilities and other health and medical facilities. This is not to dispute the importance 
and positive benefits of health and medical facilities to people with disability and 
people generally, but rather to be mindful of the risk that these sites will be overlooked 
as also being sites of violence, abuse and neglect because the violence which takes 
place in these settings might instead be perceived as therapeutically necessary and 
legally permissible. 
Disability-Specific Lawful Violence 
11. This submission urges the Senate Committee to inquire into forms of violence, abuse 
and neglect against people with disability (particularly people with intellectual 
disability, cognitive impairment and mental illness) which are termed ‘disability-
specific lawful violence’.  
                                                          
3 See, eg, Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and Melissa Clarence, ‘People with Intellectual and Other Cognitive 
Disability in the Criminal Justice System’ (Family & Community Services: Ageing, Disability & Home Care, 
2012); Eileen Baldry, Leanne Dowse and Melissa Clarence, ‘Background Paper for Outlaws to Inclusion 
Conference February 2012: People with Mental and Cognitive Disabilities: Pathways into Prison’ (University of 
New South Wales, 2012). 
4 See, eg, Beth Ribet, ‘Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of Survivor-Oriented Advocacy’ (2010) 17(2) 
Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 281. 
What is Disability-Specific Lawful Violence? 
12. In summary, ‘disability-specific lawful violence’ refers to interventions in the bodies 
and lives of people with disability, generally in medical or professional care settings, 
which are currently permitted by law because they are conducted pursuant to third party 
consent, court or tribunal authorisation or civil or forensic mental health legislation. 
Examples include: 
a. Family Court or guardianship tribunal authorised sterilisation, 
b. behavioural interventions in the form of physical restraints, deprivations of liberty 
or medical treatment authorised under guardianship legislation,  
c. involuntary mental health treatment and detention ordered under civil mental 
health legislation, and  
d. detention ordered under forensic mental health legislation (eg after a finding of 
unfitness or not guilty by reason of mental illness, where individuals not 
convicted for other reasons would be free of any further detention or 
punishment). 
‘Lawful’ 
13. The reference to ‘lawful’ in ‘disability-specific lawful violence’ refers to the fact that 
these interventions are permitted by law rather than prohibited. Thinking of violence as 
permitted by law perhaps runs counter to a common assumption that law has an 
authoritative role in defining violence through legal definitions of criminal offences and 
civil (eg tort) causes of action, coupled with rules of evidence and procedure which 
govern the individual adjudication of these causes of action.5 Yet, it is important to 
consider violence which is permitted by law because, in the context of people with 
disability lacking mental capacity, this is a core means through which violence occurs.  
14. Generally, one of the key boundaries between lawful and unlawful violence in criminal 
and civil law contexts is individual consent. Reflecting principles of autonomy and 
individualism, interventions such as physical contact and restrictions on liberty which 
                                                          
5 See generally Linda Steele, ‘Disability, Abnormality and Criminal Law: Sterilisation as Lawful and Good 
Violence’ (2014) 23(3) Griffith Law Review 467. 
would otherwise be unlawful as criminal assault, tortious battery or tortious false 
imprisonment will be lawful if consented to by the individual.6 The consent exception 
is generally seen as important recognition of the principle of individual autonomy 
insofar as it upholds the ability of individuals to control what happens to their bodies 
and protect themselves from unwanted interferences. However, this is problematic in 
the context of people with disability because it is their very perceived inability to 
consent by reason of mental incapacity which has provided a legal opening to enable 
others to determine what can be done to their bodies. Laws relating to court or tribunal 
authorisation of third party consent, substituted decision making schemes and civil and 
forensic mental health legislation all sit within this opening. 
‘Disability-specific’ 
15. ‘Disability-specific lawful violence’ is ‘disability-specific’ because it applies 
exclusively to people with disability (particularly people with intellectual disability, 
cognitive impairment and mental illness) generally by reason of ‘legal capacity’ and its 
problematic relationship to mental capacity and disability. This is explained by 
Beaupert and Steele as follows: 
‘Legal capacity’ is the basis for recognising an individual as a person before 
the law and specifically consists of ‘the ability to hold rights and duties 
(legal standing) and to exercise those rights and duties (legal agency)’. 
Legal capacity is a foundational concept in Australian law and central to an 
individual’s ability to be recognised as a legal subject (eg be a party to legal 
proceedings, engage in commercial transactions), have control over one’s 
body (eg consent to medical procedures done to one’s body) and to 
participate in society more broadly (eg vote, choose where to live). Not 
everyone holds legal capacity. For individuals who do not hold lack legal 
capacity third parties make legal decisions on their behalf.  There are a 
variety of substitute decision-making schemes – such as guardianship, the 
civil and forensic mental health systems and the Family Court’s welfare 
jurisdiction – which provide structure and oversight to third parties making 
                                                          
6 This is, of course, more nuanced due to the law around consent which does place some limits on what forms of 
conduct one can consent to. See generally Linda Steele, ‘Disability, Abnormality and Criminal Law: 
Sterilisation as Lawful and Good Violence’ (2014) 23(3) Griffith Law Review 467. 
decisions on behalf of people lacking legal capacity. These schemes have 
been viewed as ‘protective’, supportive and even empowering, because they 
direct third party decision-making towards working out what is in the 
individual’s ‘best interests’.  
Legal capacity is linked to ‘mental capacity’ and has traditionally been 
denied to people on the basis that they lack mental capacity. Mental 
capacity is ‘the decision-making skills of a person’ and mental incapacity 
has largely been assessed in terms of individualistic, internal psychological 
processes, by reference to diagnoses of mental and cognitive impairments 
(eg it is linked to such diagnoses as intellectual disability, dementia and 
schizophrenia). Significantly, this means that it is largely people with 
disability (and specifically with diagnoses or perceived diagnoses of mental 
and cognitive impairments) who are deemed mentally incapable and in turn 
are deemed to lack legal capacity.  
The assumed relationship between mental incapacity and disability is 
commonly presented as objective, scientific and natural. Yet, the self-
evidence of the association between disability and mental incapacity has 
been contested in disability studies scholarship and disability rights 
activism. This contestation can be summarised in three points. First, 
disability is constructed as negative variations in human existence through 
the operation of social norms which provide a narrow scope of valorised 
‘normality’, through a focus on particular perceived deficits. Secondly, 
society has failed to provide necessary supports for people with disability in 
many respects and those supports which are provided typically focus on 
managing or obliterating the disability – as recuperating individuals to a 
state of normality or minimising the impacts of their abnormality. Thirdly, 
mental incapacity is not, as it is commonly presented, an objective, 
scientific and naturally occurring phenomenon. Through association with 
problematic notions of disability, mental capacity is similarly constructed as 
a negative difference and devalued through the application of social norms 
of decision-making ability. The concepts of mental capacity and incapacity 
are contingent on social and political contexts, as are the disciplines, 
professions and practices which play a dominant role in assessing mental 
capacity and incapacity. 
It is the combined effects of the links between, firstly, disability and mental 
incapacity and, secondly, mental incapacity and legal capacity which render 
legal capacity and associated substitute decision-making regimes highly 
discriminatory and marginalising to people with disability. Being denied 
legal capacity means being denied the ability to make one’s own choices 
and being at the whim of the decisions of others (including decisions 
ranging from public matters of civic participation to some of the most 
intimate and private matters, and extending to decisions involving violence, 
forced treatment and invasion of privacy).7  
16. Thus, the associations in law between mental incapacity and disability, and between 
legal capacity and mental capacity, have two major implications for the purposes of the 
Senate Inquiry: (a) they have prevented individuals with disability deemed to lack legal 
capacity from making their own decisions about interventions by others in their bodies 
and lives, and (2) they have resulted in alternative legal frameworks for enabling other 
individuals to decide on interventions in the bodies and lives of people with disability. 
This is discriminatory for a number of reasons: 
a. It is done without the consent of the individual with disability, whereas contact 
or restrictions on the liberty of people without disability can never be done 
without their consent. As was stated by McHugh J in Marion’s Case:  
It is the central thesis of the common law doctrine of trespass to the 
person that the voluntary choices and decisions of an adult person of 
sound mind concerning what is or is not done to his or her body must be 
respected and accepted, irrespective of what others, including doctors, 
may think is in the best interests of that particular person.8  
                                                          
7 Fleur Beaupert & Linda Steele, ‘Questioning Law’s Capacity’ (2015) 40(3) Alternative Law Journal 
(forthcoming). 
8 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 309 (McHugh J). 
b. Reliance upon consent of third parties is possible because of problematic 
assumptions about the mental incapacity associated with particular 
impairments. 
c. The tests that form the basis of court or tribunal authorisation of third party 
consent or civil and forensic mental health orders are based on problematic 
ideas about disability,9 including its associations with danger and medical 
deficiency.  
d. The physical and mental effects of the disability-specific lawful violence are 
themselves further disabling (eg mental distress associated with detention, side 
effects of medicines, removal of bodily organs), create greater inequality 
between people with and without disability by limiting life opportunities and 
exacerbate perceptions of people with disability as ‘abnormal’ by further 
limitations to meeting social norms (eg removal of reproductive organs 
renders females ‘abnormal’ women because cannot meet social norms of 
mothering).  
17. Yet, disability-specific lawful violence is not readily labelled in society and specifically 
in law as violence, abuse and neglect (or as discriminatory) because: 
a. It is permitted by law, and law has an important moral, social and cultural role in 
defining violence. 
b. It is permitted by law specifically because it is considered to be in the ‘best 
interests’ of the individual or is necessary for the protection, safety. health or 
welfare of the individual, of others or the community at large. 
c. It is generally carried out in care or medical contexts and hence is seen as 
benevolent, beneficial or even empowering to the individual. 
d. What is appropriate in relation to individuals with disability cannot be compared 
to what is appropriate in relation to people without disability due to fundamental 
                                                          
9 Carolyn Frohmader, Dehumanised: The Forced Sterilisation of Women and Girls with Disabilities in Australia 
(Women with Disabilities Australia, 2013) 35-57; Linda Steele, ‘Making Sense of the Family Court’s Decisions 
on the Non-Therapeutic Sterilisation of Girls with Intellectual Disability’ (2008) 22(1) Australian Journal of 
Family Law 1. 
differences between these groups by reason of their varying abilities, mental 
capacities and lifestyles. 
18. Moreover, historically, sterilisation, involuntary mental health treatment and detention 
and behaviour restraints have been carried out with little judicial oversight and have 
been used as tools of repression of people with disability as exemplified by the 
widespread practices both in the United States during the mental defectives era of the 
early 20th century and the practices of Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. 
Contemporary practices which are authorised by courts or tribunals or ordered pursuant 
to legislation is typically juxtaposed to and distanced from this history by reason of the 
‘procedural safeguards’ provided by judicial oversight coupled with legal tests focused 
on ‘best interests’, protection and necessity. The layers of protection purportedly 
offered by the legal frameworks of court authorisation and substituted decision making 
might lead some to suggest that court authorised sterilisation is ultimately a safe, 
necessary and even beneficial practice, thus obfuscating arguments that this legal 
sterilisation is harmful and, specifically, is discriminatory.10  
Disability-Specific Lawful Violence is Contrary to Human Rights 
19. Disability-specific lawful violence is contrary to human rights, notably following the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘Disability 
Convention’).11 Earlier human rights instruments and international human rights 
decisions have accommodated disability-specific lawful violence by recognising the 
validity of distinctions based on mental incapacity and focusing instead on legal 
procedural safeguards in the legal authorisation or ordering of individual instances of 
such violence. In comparison, the Disability Convention prohibits such violence. 
20. By way of background, the Disability Convention does not introduce any new human 
rights but instead seeks to redefine disability and make existing human rights realisable 
for people with disability by taking account of their experiences and needs and by 
contesting pervasive medical and individual models of disability which have 
historically encouraged the discriminatory and paternalistic approaches to rights.  
                                                          
10 See generally Linda Steele, ‘Disability, Abnormality and Criminal Law: Sterilisation as Lawful and Good 
Violence’ (2014) 23(3) Griffith Law Review 467. 
11 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 3 May 2008). 
21. On a general level the Disability Convention recognises the right to non-discrimination 
and equality before and under the law12 and the right to life, to freedom from violence 
and respect of bodily and mental integrity13 (including the particular vulnerability to 
violence of women and children).14 These rights support an argument that states should 
address violence against people with disability, including forms of violence which 
apply in a discriminative, disproportionate or unequal way to people with disability (ie 
including disability-specific forms of violence).  
22. For the purposes of ‘disability-specific lawful violence’ the most significant 
contribution of the Disability Convention relates to its approach to legal capacity. The 
Disability Convention includes the right to legal capacity, which renders contrary to 
human rights forms of violence that are lawful because of a denial of legal capacity (ie 
lawful forms of violence). The CRPD recognises the right to legal capacity. Article 12 
states in part: 
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law.  
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.  
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal 
capacity. 
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of 
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent 
abuse in accordance with international human rights law. Such safeguards 
shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the 
rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and 
undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, 
apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The 
                                                          
12 See Art 3(b), Art 5(1)-(2), Preamble para (h). 
13 See Art 10, Art 15, Art 17. See also Art 16. 
14 Preamble para (q), (s). 
safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect 
the person’s rights and interests.15 
The right to legal capacity is also confirmed by the preamble to the CRPD which states: 
Recognizing the importance for persons with disabilities of their individual 
autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their own 
choices16 
One of the general principles of the CRPD stated in Article 3(a) is: 
Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to 
make one’s own choices, and independence of persons17 
23. Beaupert and Steele explain the effect of Article 12 as follows: 
Article 12 elaborates on the content of the right to equality before the law – 
guaranteed by Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights – as it relates specifically to people with disabilities. Article 
12 places obligations on States Parties to repeal laws which deny legal 
capacity to people with disability and introduce measures to support 
individuals with disability to exercise their legal capacity. It is generally 
acknowledged that Article 12 calls for a shift to the paradigm of supported 
decision-making. ‘Supported decision-making’ is a range of informal and 
formal measures which support people to exercise their legal capacity, 
notably to make their own choices to enter into legal relations and exercise 
their legal rights. Examples of supported decision-making models range 
from advice provided by family and friends to formal appointment of a 
support person.  Supported decision-making can be contrasted to ‘substitute 
decision-making’, of which the clearest examples are appointment of a 
guardian under guardianship law and compulsory treatment under mental 
health laws. Whilst it is now generally recognised that there should be a 
shift to supported decision-making, in most developed countries substitute 
                                                          
15 Article 12(1)-(4). See also Article 13 concerning access to justice and Articles 14 and 19 concerning 
deprivation of liberty. 
16 Para (n). 
17 Article 3(a). 
decision-making continues alongside increased supported decision-making 
options.  
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the 
Committee) has recently considered Article 12 in depth. Following a 
submission process (to which the authors of this article made a submission), 
the Committee adopted its General Comment dealing with Article 12, 
entitled ‘Article 12: Equal recognition before the law’, on 11 April 2014 
(General Comment), informed by the fact that there appeared to be a 
general misunderstanding of the exact scope of the obligations imposed by 
Article 12.  
The General Comment provides that States Parties to the CRPD must 
holistically examine all areas of law to ensure that the right of people with 
disability to legal capacity is not restricted on an unequal basis. The General 
Comment urges State parties to abolish substitute decision-making regimes 
in order to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to people with disability 
on an equal basis with others. It reaffirms that ‘a person’s status as a person 
with a disability or the existence of an impairment (including a physical or 
sensory impairment) must never be grounds for denying legal capacity or 
any of the rights provided for in article 12’.  
The Committee outlines three different approaches often taken in judging 
whether a person has impaired decision-making skills: the status approach; 
the outcome approach; and the functional approach. The Committee rejects 
all three approaches, on the basis that they result in a ‘discriminatory denial 
of legal capacity’ because ‘a person’s disability and/or decision-making 
skills are taken as legitimate grounds for denying his or her legal capacity 
and lowering his or her status as a person before the law’. 
The Committee emphasises that legal capacity and mental capacity are 
distinct concepts, noting that the law in most countries conflates the two 
concepts, so that a person is denied legal capacity if considered to have 
impaired decision-making skills. Although the focus of the General 
Comment is legal capacity, the General Comment also discusses and 
contests the concept of mental capacity, stating that this concept ‘is not, as 
is commonly presented, an objective, scientific and naturally occurring 
phenomenon’.18 
24. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
Committee) in its General Comment on Article 12 has linked the recognition of legal 
capacity to the recognition of other human rights and, in turn, the need to prohibit 
interventions in the bodies and lives of people with disability based on a denial of legal 
capacity:  
Respecting the right to legal capacity of persons with disabilities on an 
equal basis with others includes respecting the right of persons with 
disabilities to liberty and security of the person. The denial of the legal 
capacity of persons with disabilities and their detention in institutions 
against their will, either without their consent or with the consent of a 
substitute decision-maker, is an ongoing problem. This practice constitutes 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty and violates articles 12 and 14 of the 
Convention. States parties must refrain from such practices and establish a 
mechanism to review cases whereby persons with disabilities have been 
placed in a residential setting without their specific consent. 
The right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (art. 25) 
includes the right to health care on the basis of free and informed consent. 
States parties have an obligation to require all health and medical 
professionals (including psychiatric professionals) to obtain the free and 
informed consent of persons with disabilities prior to any treatment. In 
conjunction with the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others, 
States parties have an obligation not to permit substitute decision-makers to 
provide consent on behalf of persons with disabilities. All health and 
medical personnel should ensure appropriate consultation that directly 
engages the person with disabilities. They should also ensure, to the best of 
their ability, that assistants or support persons do not substitute or have 
undue influence over the decisions of persons with disabilities. 
                                                          
18 Fleur Beaupert & Linda Steele, ‘Questioning Law’s Capacity’ (2015) 40(3) Alternative Law Journal 
(forthcoming). 
As has been stated by the Committee in several concluding observations, 
forced treatment by psychiatric and other health and medical professionals 
is a violation of the right to equal recognition before the law and an 
infringement of the rights to personal integrity (art. 17); freedom from 
torture (art. 15); and freedom from violence, exploitation and abuse (art. 
16). This practice denies the legal capacity of a person to choose medical 
treatment and is therefore a violation of article 12 of the Convention. States 
parties must, instead, respect the legal capacity of persons with disabilities 
to make decisions at all times, including in crisis situations; must ensure 
that accurate and accessible information is provided about service options 
and that non-medical approaches are made available; and must provide 
access to independent support. States parties have an obligation to provide 
access to support for decisions regarding psychiatric and other medical 
treatment. Forced treatment is a particular problem for persons with 
psychosocial, intellectual and other cognitive disabilities. States parties 
must abolish policies and legislative provisions that allow or perpetrate 
forced treatment, as it is an ongoing violation found in mental health laws 
across the globe, despite empirical evidence indicating its lack of 
effectiveness and the views of people using mental health systems who 
have experienced deep pain and trauma as a result of forced treatment. The 
Committee recommends that States parties ensure that decisions relating to 
a person’s physical or mental integrity can only be taken with the free and 
informed consent of the person concerned. 19 
25. Thus, there is a compelling international human rights argument for the Senate 
Committee to specifically consider disability-specific lawful violence and make 
recommendations to prohibit forms of this violence.  
26. Australia is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. However, in considering term of reference (f), which is phrased in terms of 
‘compliance with its international obligations’, the Senate Inquiry might limit the 
relevance of the Disability Convention to its assessment of violence, abuse and neglect 
and to the recommendations it makes if it takes an overly formal, legalistic approach 
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which ignores the wider ethical significance and force of the Disability Convention. 
This is for two reasons. First, the Senate Committee might conclude that the extent of 
Australia’s formal compliance with obligations is limited by the legal status of 
international instruments in Australian domestic law. Second, the Senate Committee 
might conclude that Australia’s legal obligations under Article 12 of the Disability 
Convention (concerning legal capacity) are limited because of its reservation to this 
Article which is to the effect that Australia continues substituted decision making.20 
This is demonstrated by the Senate Community Affairs References Committee report 
Inquiry into the Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in 
Australia.21 In this report, the Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee took a 
narrow legalistic approach to the CRPD’s relevance to domestic law reform related to 
sterilisation.22 One of the effects of this was that ultimately the recommendations which 
recommend retaining substituted decision making framework for sterilisation were 
made in the sterilisation inquiry are not in line with Article 12 of the Disability 
Convention and other Articles protecting rights of non-discrimination and equality and 
freedom from violence.  
27. It is central that this Senate Inquiry move beyond this legalistic approach to the 
Disability Convention and look to the underlying ethical, political and social 
approaches to disability and disability rights in the Convention as providing a 
(realisable) ethical and legal ideal for the treatment of people with disability in our 
society. Laws can be reformed in ways that exceed the formal requirements of 
international legal obligations. This is demonstrated by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission recommendations in its recent report on disability and legal capacity23 
which go quite a way towards reflecting the spirit of the Disability Convention.24 
Moreover, regardless of the legal effect of the Interpretive Declaration on Article 12 
vis-à-vis substituted decision making, abolishing forms of disability-specific lawful 
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24 Fleur Beaupert & Linda Steele, ‘Questioning Law’s Capacity’ (2015) 40(3) Alternative Law Journal 
(forthcoming). 
violence is necessitated by other Articles of the Disability Convention as discussed in 
paragraphs 19 and 20 above, and by the following excerpt from the General Comment 
on Article 12: 
To achieve equal recognition before the law, legal capacity must not be 
denied discriminatorily. Article 5 of the Convention guarantees equality for 
all persons under and before the law and the right to equal protection of the 
law. It expressly prohibits all discrimination on the basis of disability. 
Discrimination on the basis of disability is defined in article 2 of the 
Convention as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of 
disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Denial of legal capacity having 
the purpose or effect of interfering with the right of persons with disabilities 
to equal recognition before the law is a violation of articles 5 and 12 of the 
Convention. States have the ability to restrict the legal capacity of a person 
based on certain circumstances, such as bankruptcy or criminal conviction. 
However, the right to equal recognition before the law and freedom from 
discrimination requires that when the State denies legal capacity, it must be 
on the same basis for all persons. Denial of legal capacity must not be based 
on a personal trait such as gender, race, or disability, or have the purpose or 
effect of treating the person differently. 
Freedom from discrimination in the recognition of legal capacity restores 
autonomy and respects the human dignity of the person in accordance with 
the principles enshrined in article 3 (a) of the Convention. Freedom to make 
one’s own choices most often requires legal capacity. Independence and 
autonomy include the power to have one’s decisions legally respected. The 
need for support and reasonable accommodation in making decisions shall 
not be used to question a person’s legal capacity. Respect for difference and 
acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and 
humanity (art. 3 (d)) is incompatible with granting legal capacity on an 
assimilationist basis.25 
28. The author urges the Senate Committee to address disability-specific lawful 
violence, by: 
a. Identifying as violence, abuse and neglect all interventions in the lives of 
people with disability, generally in medical or professional care settings, 
which are currently permitted by law because they are conducted pursuant to 
third party consent, court or tribunal authorisation or civil or forensic 
mental health legislation. 
b. Appreciating the role of law in making these forms of violence, abuse and 
neglect possible including specifically critically examining the following legal 
dimensions: 
i. The concept of legal capacity, 
ii. The legal assessment of mental incapacity and the psychological, 
neuropsychological and psychiatric definitions of mental capacity, 
iii. Schemes of substituted decisionmaking, 
iv. Legal tests and criteria such as best interests, necessity, and risk, 
and 
v. Civil and forensic mental health legislation.  
c. Making recommendations to reform laws in order to recognise legal 
capacity for all individuals regardless of perceived mental incapacity. 
d. Making recommendations to reform laws in order to abolish legal 
frameworks permitting all forms of disability-specific lawful violence. 
e. Recommending withdrawal of the Australian Government’s Interpretive 
Declaration on Article 12. 
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